

LaRutadelClima

SB60 Participation Guide

N.º 22 Climate Justice in Latin America Series

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Credits

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
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¿WHAT IS THE SB?



¿ WHAT IS THE SB?

This 2024 the sixtieth sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific Advice and Technology and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SB60) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Change Conference (UNFCCC) at the World Conference Center Bonn (WCCB) in Bonn, Germany, from June 3 to 13, 2024. Based on the agreements that arose from the Conference of the Parties (COP) 28 held in Dubai,

of the Parties (COP) 28 held in Dubai, the conference will host a large number of events organized by mandate and will continue discussions on vitally important issues, such as just transition, damage and loss fund, balance world and NCQG, among other topics. Below is a update summary around the topics before mentioned that serve as a guide to people who will participate in this space.

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WORLD BALANCE

According to Decision 19/CMA.¹, the process must be carried out with transparency. Transparency is fundamental since a critical analysis is required regarding current advances and the gaps in climate action. Based on this balance, the urgent line will be marked in which States must continue working to accelerate climate action². The GST is carried out every 5 years, the first balance was completed during COP28 in Dubai. It concluded in terms of Mitigation that global collective advances have allowed global temperature projections will go from 4°C to a range of 2.1-2.8°C with application full of the NDCs.

At the same time highlighted the concern of current progress of these NDCs since very significant reductions will be required higher than the current ones to be able to align with the temperature objective of the Paris Agreement.

The need to triple global renewable energy capacity between now and 2030 and generate a transition was also mentioned. energy that leaves fossil fuels behind in a fair, orderly and equitable way, in order to achieve net zero emissions by 2050³.

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1. UNFCCC, 'Why the Global Stocktake Is Important for Climate Action This Decade | UNFCCC' (UNFCCC) <<https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake/about-the-global-stocktake/why-the-global-stocktake-is-important-for-climate-action-this-decade#What-does-the-global-stocktake-tell-us>> accessed 10 April 2024.
 2. UNFCCC, 'Decision 19 CMA.1' (UNFCCC, 19 March 2019) <<https://unfccc.int/decisions?f%5B0%5D=body%3A4099&f%5B1%5D=session%3A4221&-search2=&page=1>> accessed 10 April 2024.
 3. UNFCCC, 'Decision 1/CMA.5 | UNFCCC' <<https://unfccc.int/documents/637531>> accessed 10 April 2024.

With respect to Adaptation, the efforts to increase capacities, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability of the Parties were recognized in their Adaptation Plans (NAP), also taking into account the greater efforts on the part of developing countries that face to the difficulty of accessing financing for the development of this type of initiatives. They highlighted the benefits of implementing ecosystem-based adaptation measures and ocean-based resilience measures⁴. For the means of implementation and support, the growing gap between the financing needs of developing countries was highlighted. Who at the same time suffer increasingly stronger effects of climate change. Regarding financing, developed countries must provide financial resources for mitigation and adaptation assistance in developing countries, this as part of their obligations under the Convention.

At COP28, developed countries were urged to urgently meet the goal of providing \$100 billion annually for mitigation and adaptation work, since so far this figure has not been met. At the same time, the existing inequality worldwide was highlighted with respect to the adoption, transfer and development of climate technologies⁵.



4. UNFCCC, 'Decision 1/CMA.5 | UNFCCC' <<https://unfccc.int/documents/637531>> accessed 10 April 2024.

5. UNFCCC, 'Decision 1/CMA.5 | UNFCCC' <<https://unfccc.int/documents/637531>> accessed 10 April 2024.

In terms of Damage and Losses, it was recognized that the main damage is being suffered in developing countries that are experiencing the adverse effects of change climate. Also, it was recognized that developing countries are limited in aspects such as the reduction of fiscal space and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Likewise, they encouraged Parties that are developing countries development to request technical assistance from through the Santiago network to avoid, reduce and address Damage and Loss⁶.

In addition to these aforementioned topics, progress in response measures was evaluated, international cooperation, guidance and way forward, which They summarize the importance of joint collaboration to improve the scope of climate action measures. The GST 2023, analyzed further

depth of all the topics mentioned in this section in Decision 1/CMA.5⁷.

Although it is a document with a lot of information, it continues to show a worrying perspective where developed countries seek to celebrate and highlight the progress that has been made, but at the same time they downplay the importance and urgency of the actions that have not been carried out for years. An example of this situation is the vocabulary used in article 18, where they focus on recognizing progress in mitigation, but do not mention that emissions reductions are not sufficient to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. This lack of transparency and objectivity seeks to paint a more positive picture of progress compared to reality, which does not allow for a clear analysis of the urgency of taking action to mitigate Climate Change.

6. UNFCCC, 'Decision 1/CMA.5 | UNFCCC' <<https://unfccc.int/documents/637531>> accessed 10 April 2024.

7. UNFCCC, 'Decision 1/CMA.5 | UNFCCC' <<https://unfccc.int/documents/637531>> accessed 10 April 2024.

Another aspect in which it continues What is needed is to include human rights and social inclusion perspectives within the framework of these documents. Although in the GST decision they are mentioned as obligations that should be considered in climate action, these are not included comprehensive in the entire document nor during the construction processes of climate action measures. For example, the Human rights are only mentioned in article 178, not as a transversal axis of the document, so these proposed climate action measures do not reach - be built in an equitable and inclusive way nor do they respond to the different needs of different populations⁸.

From this first assessment, it is expected that the Parties will take into account the current reality and implement their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) in a more ambitious way for the update of NDCs that corresponds to the year 2025, where strengthened and strengthened climate policies and commitments are expected. accelerated⁹.

The current actions shown in the NDCs do not generate sufficient results to achieve the expected emissions reductions and progress is often reported with little transparency. The lack of transparency does not allow us to know the true progress of the countries in these implementation processes, therefore, it is expected that this will be an issue that will continue to be discussed during the SB60 sessions.

8. Climate Action Network, 'Climate Action Network Submission on Experience and Lessons Learned during the First GST' <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202403041029---Climate%20Action%20Network%20submission%20on%20experience%20and%20lessons%20learned%20during%20the%20first%20GST_March%202024.pdf>.

9. UNFCCC, 'Why the Global Stocktake Is Important for Climate Action This Decade | UNFCCC' (n 1).

GLOBAL ADAPTATION GOAL

The Paris Agreement in its article 7 establishes the Global Goal of Adaptation or Global Goal of Adaptation (GGA) which seeks to improve adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change, in the context of the mitigation objective, to maintain the temperature increase at a maximum of 2 °C or 1.5 °C¹⁰.

To develop this goal in detail, the program of Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work at COP26. The purpose of this goal is to identify and highlight progress, the needs and deficiencies in the strengthening processes

of resilience and vulnerability, this to seek that the Parties increase financial and technical support for adaptation¹¹.

In the CMA 4 decision, the Parties initiated a framework for GGA that was accepted in the CMA 5 decision and includes thematic objectives for climate adaptation and resilience. A two-year work program was also established in CMA 5 from COP28 in the United Arab Emirates to COP30 in Belém, on the development of indicators to measure progress achieved towards the objectives identified in the framework¹².

10. UNFCCC, 'Global Goal on Adaptation' (UNFCCC) <<https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/gga>> accessed 10 April 2024.

11. UNFCCC, 'Global Goal on Adaptation' (UNFCCC) <<https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/gga>> accessed 10 April 2024.

12. UNFCCC, 'Global Goal on Adaptation' (UNFCCC) <<https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/gga>> accessed 10 April 2024.

DAMAGES AND LOSSES FUND

Article 8 of the Paris Agreement establishes addressing Damages and Losses, echoing the obligation to mitigate adverse effects mentioned in the UNFCCC in its article 3(3).

In decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4, new Financing Arrangements were created to assist developing countries to respond to loss and damage, with an emphasis on addressing loss and damage. Within these Financing Arrangements, a loss and damage response fund was created whose mandate includes an emphasis on addressing loss and damage¹³.

During COP28, the structure and operationalization conditions of the fund were determined, which mark its development line¹⁴.

In the Fund's Governing Instrument it was given the objective of assisting developing countries that are particularly vulnerable in responding to economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change without mentioning the coping approach.

The Financial Arrangements in its objective are mentioned in a special focus on dealing with damages and losses, which is important when defining its mission. Although the Fund and the Financial Arrangements are complementary, it is important to note that the fund is limited to addressing "priority gaps in the current landscape of institutions, including global, regional and national institutions, that finance activities related to the response." to loss and damage¹⁵.

13. UNFCCC, Decisión 2/CP.27 Funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including a focus on addressing loss and damage. <https://unfccc.int/documents/626561>.

14. UNFCCC, 'Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage' (UNFCC) <<https://unfccc.int/loss-and-damage-fund-joint-interim-secretariat>> accessed 10 April 2024.

15. Decision -/CP.28 -/CMA.5 Operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage referred to in paragraphs 2–3 of decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4.

Apart from this limitation on the scope of the Fund and the restrictions on its financing based on voluntary donations or financial services, it is relevant to emphasize that the bulk of the financing for Damages and Losses will come from the Financial Arrangements reached with the World Bank, regional development banks and the International Monetary Fund.

The Loss and Damage Fund (LDF) financing campaign can materialize contributions through loans on very favorable conditions, donations (public or private) and "sources".innovative." The LDF can provide donations, but also loans, which is extremely worrying in the current debt crisis faced by the most vulnerable countries. Debt increases vulnerability, as countries in the Global South already have extremely reduced fiscal space, due to debt payments made to the North.

The LDF may also use additional financial instruments such as "grants, highly concessional loans, guarantees, direct budget support and policy-based financing, equity, insurance mechanisms, risk-sharing mechanisms, pre-arranged financing, performance-based programs and other products financial". This can be further explored in the publication of La Ruta del Clima "A Post-colonial Fund for Damage and Losses: An unequal exchange of responsibilities and resources."The World Bank will serve as host entity for four provisional years, the Fund will operate with the personality and legal capacity of the World Bank, and the immunities granted to the World Bank will apply to officials, property, assets, files, income, operations and transactions of the Fund. Furthermore, it is established that the World Bank

has a period of six months to from the conclusion of COP28 to confirm its willingness and ability to meet the conditions established by the Fund Board. Also, a maximum period of eight months was given from the end of CPO28, for an agreement on the host entity to be presented between the Fund Board and the World Bank. This agreement should be based on consultations with the Board of the Fund and in the guidance it provides to the World Bank. Likewise Similarly, if the Bank does not comply with the conditions established in the agreements during the provisional period, the Board of the Fund may operate the Fund as an independent autonomous institution¹⁶.

role with respect to the fund and it is unlikely that it will not comply with what is required.

With respect to the Board of Fund this must have representatives from developed countries, members of the States of Asia and the Pacific, of the States of Africa, of the States of Latin America and the Caribbean, of the small States developing countries, least developed countries and one member from a developing country not included in regional groups and groupings.

Each representative will serve for a period of three years and may be re-elected for a maximum of two terms. in a row. This Board was elected during the month of March 2024 and its first meeting was held from April 30 to May 2 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

16. Decision -/CP.28 -/CMA.5 Operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage referred to in paragraphs 2–3 of decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4.

Below is the list of Board representatives that was published by UNFCCC¹⁷:

CONSTITUENT	COUNTRY	REPRESENTATIVE
Antonella Baldino	Italia	Países desarrollados
Sebastian Lesch	Alemania	Países desarrollados
Jean-Christophe Donnellier (Co-Chair)	Francia	Países desarrollados
Ana Paula Rodrigues Rodrigues	Portugal	Países desarrollados
Marjeta Jager	Unión Europea	Países desarrollados
Jens Fugl	Dinamarca	Países desarrollados
José Delgado	Austria	Países desarrollados
Laurence Ahoussou	Canadá	Países desarrollados
Atsushi Kato	Japón	Países desarrollados
Georg Børsting	Noruega	Países desarrollados
Gerard Howe	Reino Unido	Países desarrollados
Rebecca Lawlor	Estados Unidos de América	Países desarrollados
Abdulla Ahmed Bala-laa Al Harthi	Emiratos Árabes Unidos	Estados de Asia y el Pacífico
Mohammad Ayoub	Arabia Saudita	Estados de Asia y el Pacífico
Mark Dennis Y.C. Joven	Filipinas	Estados de Asia y el Pacífico

17. Decision -/CP.28 -/CMA.5 Operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage referred to in paragraphs 2–3 of decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4.

CONSTITUENT	COUNTRY	REPRESENTATIVE
Richard Sherman (Co-Chair)	David Kaluba	Zambia
Mohamed Nasr	Egipto	Estados de África
David Kaluba	Zambia	Estados de África
Liliam Beatris Chagas de Moura	Liliam Beatris Chagas de Moura	Liliam Beatris Chagas de Moura
Elena Pereira	Honduras	Estados de América Latina y el Caribe
H. Elizabeth Thompson	Barbados	Estados de América Latina y el Caribe
Daniel Lund	Fiyi	Pequeños Estados insulares en desarrollo
Peter Abraham Jr	Antigua y Barbuda	Pequeños Estados insulares en desarrollo
Adao Soares Barbosa	Timor Oriental	Países menos adelantados
Djibril Ibila	Benín	Países menos adelantados

In the climate regime, States have the obligation of the parties to promote participation in their spaces. In this time of climate crisis, decision-making processes must strive to comply with Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration and open doors to people, since environmental issues are best addressed with the effective participation of civil society. This topic is discussed in the La Ruta del Clima publication, "A People Centered Loss and Damage Fund." This publication establishes that there is a great need for the Fund to have an adequate structure that considers public participation, including that of vulnerable groups¹⁸.

This is why the Fund must adopt provisions to allow the effective participation of observers in its meetings, including the development and implementation of an observer accreditation process.

including the development and implementation of an observer accreditation process.

In addition, the Fund will establish consultative forums to interact and communicate with representatives of civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations dedicated to the environment and development, unions, Indigenous peoples, youth, women, climate migrants, industries and sectors affected by change. climate, among other interested parties.

With the objective of promoting the participation of these entities and groups in decision-making, these forums must maintain a balance between the geographical regions where they are held¹⁹.

18. Adrián Martínez, 'A People Centered Loss and Damage Fund' (La Ruta del Clima, 1 November 2023) <<https://larutadelclima.org/2023/11/01/a-people-centered-ldf/>> accessed 2 May 2024.

19. UNFCCC, 'Operationalization of the New Funding Arrangements, Including a Fund, for Responding to Loss and Damage Referred to in Paragraphs 2–3 of Decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4. Draft Decision -/CP.28 -/CMA.5. Proposal by the President | UNFCCC' (n 14).

NEW COLLECTIVE GOAL QUANTIFIED ABOUT FINANCING

The New Collective Quantified Climate Finance Goal (NCQG) is a global climate finance target to be set by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) from a minimum of USD 100 billion annually, by 2025. Regarding the most recent agreements, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) establishes a new quantified collective goal (NCQG) from a floor of 100 billion dollars per year for mitigation actions and implementation transparency and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries.

The CMA agreed to consider the objective of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable development, strengthen efforts to eradicate poverty and resilient development climate in decision 1/CP.21 paragraph 53. By decision 9/CMA.3, the Parties agreed that deliberations on the NCQG will be organized around the following elements:

- Ad hoc work program
- Submissions by Parties and interested parties that are not Parties
- High-level ministerial dialogues
- Balance and orientation of the CMA

The CMA, by decision5/CMA.4, recognized the need to significantly strengthen the work program on the NCQG. This strengthening must occur in light of the urgency of expanding action to realize significant outcomes from the deliberations on all elements and establish the NCQG in 2024. To achieve the goal of the NCQG taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries, eight technical dialogues were held in 2023 around finance in order to prepare a draft negotiated text before COP29. These dialogues bring together experts from governments, academia,

academia, NGOs, the private sector, and other stakeholders to provide critical input following a structured work plan developed annually by the designated program co-chairs²⁰.

The first dialogue provided the opportunity to outline the various issues that must be addressed to reach a consensus decision at COP29, in the following dialogues some more critical aspects are addressed such as the objective, deadline, structure, amount, the mobilization and provision of various financial sources, quality and transparency agreements²¹.

20. Melkie(2023) Perspectivas de la COP28 sobre el establecimiento del nuevo objetivo de financiación climática. <https://cfanadvisors.org/whats-new-on-the-ncqg/>

21. Melkie(2023) Perspectivas de la COP28 sobre el establecimiento del nuevo objetivo de financiación climática. <https://cfanadvisors.org/whats-new-on-the-ncqg/>

Since the 2015 commitment to mobilize 100 billion a year, the promised amount has not been provided. In front of process of positioning a new, more ambitious and appropriate goal to face the consequences of the climate change and the need from USD 900,000 million in 2020 to USD 5 trillion annually by 2030, a consensual position is sought by developed and developing countries. As mentioned in the joint intervention of TUNGO, YOUNGO, WGC, ENGO CAN-DCJ at TED9, without an increase significant amount of climate finance there will be no trust, ambition, enforcement or climate justice.

In this process, the countries in development put on the table the need to raise the goal and take responsibility economic from common, but differentiated, responsibilities.

The panorama of the Damage and Loss Fund remains uncertain within the framework of the NCQG, with the Global North opposed to including this issue in the discussion.²² Developed countries concentrate on promoting financing towards the private sector seeking to dilute their responsibilities. , while developing countries continue to face insufficient funds to confront the consequences of Climate Change²³. The new goal must be aimed at an NCQG based on the obligations and responsibilities of the countries of the Global North and the real needs of vulnerable countries. An NCQG focused on providing financing for mitigation, adaptation and Damage and Loss, taking into account elements linked to gender, local communities, climate justice, marginalization, discrimination and exclusion, as well as the need for transparency and accountability for a fair improvement in the different regions.

22. Liboreiro(2022) ¿Debe el Norte global pagar las reparaciones climáticas al Sur?. Euronews

23. Schalatek (2023) El futuro de la financiación climática está en el centro de las negociaciones de la COP28. <https://us.boell.org/en/2023/11/20/future-climate-finance-provision-center-cop28-negotiations>

JUST TRANSITION

The term just transition had origin in the context of debates on how to carry out an energy transition in order to meet the environmental goals established without pass the cost on to the most vulnerable populations. This concept was transformed and integrated within spaces such as the conferences of the parties of the UNFCCC addressing themes beyond the energy issue.

The just transition seeks to maximize the social and economic opportunities of action climate, but at the same time minimizes the challenges for the populations in this process²⁴. It seeks to generate numerous benefits such as generating public support for a green jobs revolution to aid for promote local solutions, in addition

These actions pursue social change linked to reforming current patterns and systems that weaken social equality and climate equity. A just transition focused on social and climate justice is the best vehicle to build and maximize decarbonization and increase resilience is the current dominant discourse around the issue.

The Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) defines common elements that a just transition should have such as: 1) Investments in the establishment of low-emission and labor-intensive technologies and sectors. 2) Research and early evaluation of the social and labor impacts of climate policies. 3) Social dialogue and democratic consultation of msocial partners and interested parties.

24. OIT(2015) Directrices de política para una transición justa hacia economías y sociedades ambientalmente sostenibles para todos. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_432865.pdf

4) Creation of decent jobs, active labor market policies and rights at work. 5) Equity in access and use of energy. 6) Economic diversification based on investments with low carbon emissions. 7) Realistic vocational training/retraining programs that generate decent jobs. 8) Gender-specific policies that promote equitable outcomes. 9) Promotion of international cooperation and coordinated multilateral actions. 10) Compensation for past harms and perceived injustices. 11) Consideration of intergenerational justice issues, such as the impacts of political decisions on future generations.²⁵

At COP27 it is decided to establish a work program on the "just transition" known as the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan that affirms a just transition based on social dialogue.²⁶

The CMA affirmed that sustainable and just solutions to the climate crisis must be based on meaningful and effective social dialogue and participation in pursuit of the global transition towards low emissions.²⁷ It is emphasized that the just and equitable transition encompasses pathways that include energy, socioeconomic, labor and other, all of which must be based on development priorities defined at the national level and include social protection to mitigate the potential impacts it may generate.²⁸ It should be noted that this process involves the use of natural resources from the Global South so that developed countries meet the goal. This means that the Global South has the opportunity at this moment to manage these resources or lose them again in the cycle of extractivism in which they are involved. This process should be a tool to define fair and to whom it is fair,

25. IPCC, 2022. Sexto informe de evaluación, Cambio climático 2022: mitigación del cambio climático (Grupo de Trabajo II).

26. ITUC (2022) La COP27 establece un programa de trabajo sobre la transición justa centrado en el diálogo y la protección sociales. <https://www.ituc-csi.org/la-cop27-establece-un-programa-de?lang=en>

27. UNFCCC (2023) 3/CMA.5 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2023_16a01_adv_.pdf

28. UNFCCC (2023) 3/CMA.5 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2023_16a01_adv_.pdf

does not constitute a continuous discursive struggle in an unequal decision-making space, where developing countries have the least voice or none at all.²⁹

Engaging communities in a just transition allows you to analyze the potential obstacles they face in accessing and using information regarding environmental and social impacts, as well as community investments. The just transition must encourage communities that already live with the consequences of climate change have at least access to decent work, growth economic,

the reduction of inequalities and responsible production and consumption in their resilience processes.

The CMA decided, at its fifth session, to establish a work program (WP) under the guidance of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on Just Transition Pathways to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement outlined in the article 2, paragraph 1, in the context of article 2.³⁰

29. Alarcón et al(2022) Repensando las 'Transiciones Justas': Reflexiones Críticas para el Sur Global.

30. Alarcón et al(2022) Repensando las 'Transiciones Justas': Reflexiones Críticas para el Sur Global.



Civil society participation

THERE
IS NO
PLANET B

LOSS
DAMAGE
FINANCE

¿ WHO CAN PARTICIPATE?

The SB60 spaces are not open to the public, to enter you must have the corresponding accreditation, either as a representative of the Parties to the Convention, representative of the observer organizations or as members of the press. Spaces are increasingly limited to attend. For areas such as Latin America, Africa and Asia, the organization to attend these spaces in person is complex in terms of mobility costs, which limits the effective participation of civil society directly. By 2024, added to this situation, The number of accreditations was drastically reduced. Within the observer organizations there are three subgroups, representatives of the United Nations, Intergovernmental Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

At the same time, the NGOs are distributed in different participating constituents that represent different interests and work areas, these are divided into ³¹:

- Companies and Industries (BINGO)
- Environmental (ENGO)
- Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPO)
- Farmers and peasants
- Local administrations and municipal authorities (LGMA)
- Research Oriented and Independent Organizations (RINGO)
- Trade unions (TUNGO)
- Women and Gender (WGC)
- Childhood and youth (YOUNGO)

31. UNFCCC, 'Constituency Focal Points - Contacts' (UNFCC) <<https://unfccc.int/documents/228031>> accessed 13 April 2024.

¿ WHERE CAN YOU PARTICIPATE?

Civil society can participate in different ways in spaces like SB60, one of the main ways is to follow up on the negotiations. In these spaces, chairs are set up in the back of the rooms so that observers can join the negotiation. It is usual for the room to be full and there are no representatives of the Parties to enter and the observers are expelled from the space. It has become common practice for observers to be relegated to following sessions through live broadcasts on the event website in the conference hallways. On very limited occasions, observers are allowed to speak or are invited to sit at the negotiation table so that they can express their points of view.

interests and perspectives represent. At climate change conferences it has already become customary that attending does not guarantee observing in person, much less participating. In the past three climate conferences there has been a peculiar "shortage of chairs" to allow observers to enter the discussion rooms. Initially at COP26 due to COVID restriction, then in COP27 due to fire regulations and then in COP28 simply due to the absence of chairs, civic space is increasingly limited. In the SB60, given the emergence of new barriers due to lack of financing so that the UNFCCC can maintain the access and conditions of participation.

At conferences, parallel events can be organized by institutions, organizations and civil society groups to share information, create spaces for dialogue and discussions on relevant topics in different parts of the world, and related to the negotiations during the conference. Unfortunately, the way in which these events have been organized during the last conferences has not allowed the voices of these organizations and institutions to be truly heard, since the delegations of negotiators do not have to participate in these spaces, making it very difficult for them to messages reach decision makers.

Added to the above, for the SB60 the reduction of accreditations was drastic for most organizations.

This situation together with the elimination of transmission virtual events by the organization, excusing the lack of equipment, directly limits the possibility of observing what happens during these spaces for the public in the global South. Is That is, it is in the hands of the civil society organizations that have the possibility and desire to share information and transmit it, which are mostly from the Global North. Regarding side events, for organizations that were confirmed, but not had access to accreditations, notification of their possibility of participation and if they did not obtain accreditations were requested cancellation of the event, as the only option on the part of the UNFCCC, revealing a disinterest in providing options for participation.

For Lien Vandamme, Human Rights and Climate Change activist at the Center for International Environmental Law, it is essential to defend the importance of meaningful participation, she points out that "people have to be able to be in the negotiation rooms and, ideally, participate in the negotiations." We know that the latter has hardly happened, since it is a 'Party-led process', but there are examples of other processes, such as the CBD, in which the participation of observers is undoubtedly more significant. „However, we have seen - especially at COPs - more and more restrictions on the entry of observers into the room."

the entry of observers into the room." Furthermore, it is impossible to understand how the reduction of accreditations for civil society organizations is justified in the absence of financial resources or equipment, but the participation of fossil fuel executives and lobbyists in the UNFCCC climate conferences continues to increase. This marks the reality of power that these companies possess over the decisions that are made in these climate discussion spaces and the clear conflict of interest that their participation demonstrates. In the Climate Route publication "Participating is a right" this problem is explained in detail.

Likewise, there are advocacy actions that are generally organized by the different constituents in public spaces, where members of civil society are invited to be part of the demonstrations or actions. Are activities seek to express urgent messages to negotiators and other conference participants, they are also claims spaces before injustices and inequalities experienced in climate matters in the most vulnerable regions of the world. injustices and inequalities experienced in climate matters in the most vulnerable regions of the world

Effective participation is increasingly limited in the UNFCCC where the spaces to provide contributions are restricted and to give Interventions by representatives of the observers are limited to a few minutes per week. It is our perception that the. Participation in conferences suffers from epistemological washing, and the processes are designed to ignore and overshadow the voices of citizens.

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